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Abstract 3 
 4 
A small but growing body of evidence suggests that alongside misconceptions in predictions 5 
about object motion, adults and children hold relevant underlying conceptions, reflected in 6 
recognition, which provide greater understanding of such events. However, the relationship 7 
between knowledge retrieved in predictions and in recognition is unclear. One significant 8 
element contributing to misconceptions about motion is object mass. This aspect was used to 9 
provide further insight into the knowledge relationship. Predictions and recognition of fall in 10 
5- to 11-year-old children (N = 121) were addressed in the present study. The results suggest 11 
that children’s recognition of object motion is far better than their expressed anticipation of 12 
such events, as they normally recognised correct events as correct and rejected incorrect ones 13 
yet predictions were typically in error. Response time data provide additional insight. The 14 
findings are discussed in relation to different models of knowledge representations, favouring 15 
a hybrid model. 16 
 17 
Keywords: Conceptual development; everyday physics; object fall; object mass 18 
 19 
1. Introduction 20 
 21 
From a young age children hold extensive but largely erroneous beliefs about the physical 22 
world, beliefs which they construct on the basis of personal experiences (Klaassen, 2005). A 23 
myriad of studies is available (see Duit, 2009, for a comprehensive list), documenting the 24 
wide range of misconceptions present in childhood. Among these are beliefs about dynamic 25 
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events involving objects, a particularly ubiquitous element of the physical world (Planinic, 26 
Boone, Krsnik, & Beilfuss, 2006). These beliefs are not isolated ideas but conceptual 27 
structures that can be called upon in reasoning and that, despite their limitations, provide a 28 
coherent framework for understanding the world. A prominent view is that we hold innate 29 
core knowledge about the physical world that is enhanced over time (e.g. Baillargeon & 30 
Carey, 2012; but also see e.g. Hood & Santos, 2009, for a wider discussion around the origins 31 
of such knowledge). 32 
Accessing relevant conceptual knowledge structures in motion prediction tasks that are 33 
coupled with explicit explanations – such as planning motion trajectories or deciding the 34 
location of an object following an anticipated path – necessitates deliberation, reflection, and 35 
a conscious understanding of rules or decisions (Hogarth, 2001; Plessner & Czenna, 2008): 36 
an explicit engagement with the structures is required. At the same time, a small but growing 37 
field of research suggests infants (Friedman, 2002; Kannass, Oakes, & Wiese, 1999; Kim & 38 
Spelke, 1992), children (Howe, Taylor Tavares, & Devine, 2012, 2014; Kim & Spelke, 1999) 39 
and adults (Kaiser & Proffitt, 1984; Kaiser, Proffitt, Whelan, & Hecht, 1992; Naimi, 2011; 40 
Shanon, 1976) are able to recognise dynamic trajectories that are physically correct and to 41 
reject trajectories that appear unnatural to them, even if they are more likely to predict the 42 
unnatural events beforehand. Such recognition tasks may merely need to engage underlying 43 
tacit knowledge structures (Collins, 2010) – structures set to provide quick responses without 44 
conscious awareness, by eliciting feelings of familiarity with events. Although there is some 45 
indication that very young children engage in predictive anticipation when evaluating 46 
outcomes of dynamic events (e.g. Lee & Kuhlmeier, 2013) it is debatable whether these 47 
anticipations can be seen as explicit predictions since these children eventually chose an 48 
incorrect response – likely through some process of reflection and deliberation – despite very 49 
initially displaying accurate looking, which may be accounted for by quick responses without 50 
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conscious awareness.  51 
Currently, there are at least three divergent views on the relationship between these two 52 
manifestations of knowledge. Firstly, explicit understanding is perceived to be a partial 53 
version of tacit knowledge whereby the two exist within a single system (Kim, 2012; Kim & 54 
Spelke, 1999; Spelke & Hespos, 2001). Specifically, in the process of elevating tacit 55 
conceptions to the explicit level, elements are omitted, causing differences in outcomes 56 
between tasks relying on different knowledge. According to the second view, on the other 57 
hand, explicit and tacit knowledge are two mutually exclusive coexisting systems, seemingly 58 
unaffected by each other (Hogarth, 2001; Plessner & Czenna, 2008). Depending on task 59 
requirements only one of the systems is accessed. The more recent third view rejects 60 
omission and separation, and proposes a hybrid model in which there are two, partially 61 
associated knowledge systems wherein explicit knowledge is, in part, an embellishment of 62 
knowledge held at the tacit level (Carey, 2009; Howe, 2014; Howe et al., 2012, 2014). There 63 
is to date no clear evidence favouring just one of these views – a shortcoming addressed by 64 
the present research. 65 
Object mass, being one of the most fundamental concepts of the physical world (Galili, 66 
2001), may help shed light on this matter. It is a concept that appears to be in place early in 67 
development; the general ability to distinguish between heavy and light emerges within the 68 
first year of life (Hauf & Paulus, 2011; Hauf, Paulus, & Baillargeon, 2012; Molina, Guimpel, 69 
& Jouen, 2006; Molina & Jouen, 2003; Paulus & Hauf, 2011). Furthermore, this particular 70 
concept plays a key role in the development of commonsense theories of motion, as children 71 
rely upon mass to explain their predictions of fall – many children hold the persistent belief 72 
that one object will fall faster than another because the first is heavier than the second (Baker, 73 
Murray, & Hood, 2009; Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a; Nachtigall, 74 
1982; Sequeira & Leite, 1991; van Hise, 1988). Given the ubiquity of dynamic events, as 75 
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well as the early developing understanding of the concept of mass, that inform everyday 76 
experiences, these limitations in understanding of object motion might seem surprising.  77 
The importance of object mass in the current context therefore lies with the fact that it has, 78 
in actuality, little effect on motion patterns – two balls of same size but different mass will 79 
move at almost identical speeds – thereby becoming irrelevant to recognition tasks. An ability 80 
to recognise events as correct where objects move at the same speeds would suggest that 81 
recognition is not susceptible to interference from object mass concepts. This in turn would 82 
imply that predictive beliefs are a result of independently existing structures or of 83 
embellishment of underlying conceptions rather than omission. Research with adults suggests 84 
that expectations specifically relate to mass – a heavy ball is expected to fall faster than a 85 
light ball – but acceptance of such motion patterns as correct is much lower, with a tendency 86 
towards a more accurate representation of object motion (Naimi, 2011). Children also expect 87 
items to fall faster than others because they are heavier – but can similar mass-based 88 
differences between prediction and recognition be observed during childhood?  89 
Three hypotheses can be stated to address each of the three divergent views outlined 90 
above. In all three cases, based on the literature, the anticipated outcome is that children will 91 
predict (P) the heavy ball (H) to be faster, with next to no light-faster (L) or same-speed (S) 92 
predictions (P = H>L=S). The omission view would envisage a recognition (R) task outcome 93 
where factors in addition to mass are being taken into account. If other object variables such 94 
as size and shape are controlled for this should lead to a similar outcome as in predictions 95 
since mass would continue to be a part of the process (R = H>L=S). On the other hand, under 96 
the proviso that underlying knowledge is highly accurate, the separate systems view would 97 
dictate a distinct set of recognition task findings. Same-speed trials would be uniquely 98 
recognised as being correct; heavy-faster and light-faster trials would be rejected in equal 99 
manner (R = S>H=L). Finally, if knowledge representations exist within a hybrid model high 100 
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success rates on same-speed trial recognition should be anticipated but, in line with 101 
predictions, also some heavy-faster trial recognition that significantly exceeds that of light-102 
faster trials (R = S>H>L). The study described below was an attempt to assess children’s 103 
recognition of dynamic events, with motion either adhering to physical laws or contravening 104 
them, by placing particular emphasis on the role that object mass plays in such events. 105 
 106 
2. Method 107 
 108 
2.1 Participants 109 
 110 
Participants were recruited from a state primary school located in a suburban area of 111 
Cambridge, UK. The sample was drawn from those children whose parents did not object to 112 
their participation, and who, when they were non-native speakers of English, were identified 113 
by class teachers as capable of understanding the research instructions. This amounted to 121 114 
children (66 girls), including 23 Year 1 children (12 girls; age M = 6.15 years, SD = 0.40), 31 115 
Year 2 children (18 girls; age M = 7.12 years, SD = 0.34), 33 Year 4 children (19 girls; age M 116 
= 9.12 years, SD = 0.37) and 34 Year 6 children (17 girls; age M = 11.17 years, SD = 0.44). 117 
An additional nine children participated but were not considered for data analysis due to 118 
insufficient completion of practice trials, not completing both tasks, or due to technical errors. 119 
 120 
2.2 Design and Materials 121 
 122 
Both tasks were computer-presented scenarios involving two balls, a dark green marble 123 
and a bright pink table tennis ball (green = ‘heavy’, 75 g, 4 cm diameter; pink = ‘light’, 3 g, 4 124 
cm diameter). Real equivalents of the two balls were made available to the children during 125 
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the tasks to support full understanding of scenarios, as simulations are more effective in 126 
meaning when accompanied by relevant tactile experiences (cf. Lazonder & Ehrenhard, 127 
2014). Scenarios for both tasks were presented using DMDX, which also records response 128 
times (Forster & Forster, 2003). The order of scenarios within individual test stages was 129 
randomly varied via the computer program. 130 
 131 
2.2.1 Prediction task 132 
 133 
Scenarios were developed in PowerPoint. Each scenario showed the two balls at their 134 
initial point of anticipated motion and being held by a hand. Next to the scenarios were three 135 
brief possible motion outcomes written in large font against coloured backgrounds. The 136 
options read ‘A is faster’, ‘B is faster’ and ‘Same speed’ (see Figure 1, left). Each of the three 137 
response options had a different background colour; the top response had a red background, 138 
the response in the middle had a yellow background, and the bottom response had a blue 139 
background. Background colours always remained in the same order but response options 140 
were rotated across locations. Thus, a total of six scenarios were prepared for this task, 141 
amounting to all possible combinations of ball location and response location. In addition, 142 
practice scenarios were developed in PowerPoint, with each scenario showing two squares of 143 
same or differing sizes with three options to choose from (‘A is bigger’, ‘B is bigger’, ‘Same 144 
size’). 145 
 146 
2.2.2 Recognition task 147 
 148 
Scenarios were recorded with a Sony DCR-HC35E digital video camera recorder. Clips 149 
were initially filmed individually with one ball only, using the same set-up of transparent 150 
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tube placed in a vertical position as in the prediction task. A hand would hold one of the two 151 
balls into the tube and release it. Clips were filmed to account for the two ball types and hand 152 
location (left versus right). Using Windows Movie Maker each of the clips was slowed down 153 
to half the speed. These clips were then compiled to show two tubes within one scenario, 154 
ensuring the two balls were always contrasting in colour but accounting for location (left 155 
versus right). Both balls were shown being held into the tubes and then released 156 
simultaneously (see Figure 1, right). By compiling these clips three different scenarios were 157 
created: either showing motion as it occurs naturally (‘same-speed’), or showing modified 158 
motion where, non-naturally, one ball was twice as fast as the other – either the heavy ball 159 
(‘heavy-faster’) or the light ball (‘light-faster’). Thus, a total of six scenarios were prepared 160 
for this study, amounting to all possible combinations of ball speed and ball location. Quality 161 
of scenarios was not compromised between compilations, including where slowed-down clips 162 
had been used. All compiled video clips were 10 s long, with motion occurring at 5 s into the 163 
clip, to give enough opportunity to note ball locations. In addition, practice scenarios were 164 
developed in PowerPoint, with each scenario either showing a blue circle or a red triangle. 165 
 166 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 167 
 168 
2.3 Procedure 169 
 170 
Each child was assessed on an individual basis. To begin, the child was introduced to 171 
the two balls. Both balls could be handled at any time, but the child was prevented from 172 
carrying out relevant actions during the task, that is, deliberately letting them fall was not 173 
permitted. The trials were presented on a Sony VAIO VGN-NR21J laptop and displayed on 174 
an external 15” LCD colour monitor connected to the laptop. An external KeySonicTM Nano 175 
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Keyboard ACK-3400U, also connected to the laptop, was used for responding to the trials. 176 
The keyboard was masked to reduce distractions from unnecessary keys. Three keys were 177 
indicated by colour on the masking. Keys not used were disabled. One key was in the centre 178 
of the keyboard (yellow key); the other two were at the left end (red key) and at the right end 179 
(blue key) in the same row as the centre key. Each child completed both tasks and the tasks 180 
were carried out approximately six weeks apart from one another. 181 
 182 
2.3.1 Prediction task 183 
 184 
With the monitor screen blank, the researcher familiarised the child with the monitor and 185 
the keyboard. He asked the child to point out each key according to its colour. The child was 186 
then asked to press the yellow key. This elicited an on-screen introduction to the materials. 187 
The child saw a series of diagrams of the monitor and keyboard, which the researcher used to 188 
explain the procedure by showing the link between response choices and keys to press. At the 189 
end of the introduction the child was told that there would be some easy trials to practice 190 
with. If children were unable to read the response options the researcher followed the trials 191 
and gave the child instructions, which always corresponded to the particular trial on the 192 
screen. Responses were always read out from top to bottom. The researcher pointed to the 193 
picture in question and the corresponding response option each time. In the practice trials the 194 
researcher would say to the child: “If you think the square on the top [researcher points at 195 
picture A] is bigger, press the red key. If you think the square on the bottom [researcher 196 
points at picture B] is bigger, press the yellow key. If you think they are both the same size, 197 
press the blue key”. For the test trials the child was given the following instruction: “If you 198 
think the ball on the left [researcher points at picture A] will fall faster, press the red key. If 199 
you think the ball on the right [researcher points at picture B] will fall faster, press the 200 
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yellow key. If you think they will both fall as fast as each other, press the blue key”. No 201 
motion occurred and children were not provided with feedback whether their response was 202 
correct or not. Each child was expected to respond to all trials, and the task took around 15 203 
minutes per child. 204 
 205 
2.3.2 Recognition task 206 
 207 
For half of the children the ‘yes’ response was the left key and the ‘no’ response the right 208 
key, and vice versa for the other half. For the practice trials, the child was given the following 209 
instruction: “Watch carefully, and decide as quickly as you can. I want you to look for a blue 210 
circle. Every time you see a blue circle, press ‘yes’ [researcher points to ‘yes’ key]. Every 211 
time you see a red triangle, press ‘no’ [researcher points to ‘no’ key]”. The child was then 212 
asked to press the yellow key, which started the trials. For the test trials the child was given 213 
the following instruction: “You are going to see two hands holding these two balls 214 
[researcher points to both balls] inside the tube and letting them go. Watch carefully, and 215 
decide, as quickly as you can, whether it looks right or not. If it looks right, press ‘yes’ 216 
[researcher points to ‘yes’ key] and if it does not look right, press ‘no’ [researcher points to 217 
‘no’ key]”. To support the explanation children were shown two sheets of paper next to the 218 
two keys, showing the word ‘yes’ accompanied by a green tick and the word ‘no’ 219 
accompanied by a red cross. Children were not provided with feedback whether their 220 
response was correct or not. Each child was expected to respond to all trials, and the task took 221 
around 15 minutes per child. 222 
 223 
3. Results 224 
 225 
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Mean scores for both tasks were converted to percentages and analysed according to 226 
which types of trials – heavy-faster, light-faster or same-speed – were more likely to be 227 
predicted and more likely to be recognised as being correct, regardless of whether they were 228 
actually correct. One-sample t-tests were used to compare trial type percentages with chance 229 
levels (33.3% for each prediction trial and 50% for each recognition trial). One-way 230 
ANOVAs and post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections were then used to examine 231 
differences between the three types of trials in each task type as well as to examine 232 
differences between age groups on each trial type. The results are summarised in Figure 2. To 233 
examine any further details in the reasoning process of the recognition task one-way 234 
ANOVAs and t-tests were used to evaluate response times. In addition, between-samples t-235 
tests were carried out to evaluate any gender differences. No significant gender differences 236 
were noted so these are not considered further. All data were analysed using SPSS 21.  237 
 238 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 239 
 240 
3.1 Prediction task 241 
 242 
Heavy-faster predictions (M = 88.29%, SD = 30.78) occurred significantly more 243 
frequently than if performing at chance level, t(120) = 19.64, p < .001, r = .87, with the same 244 
effect noted for each age group. There was significant variation in predictions among the four 245 
age groups, F(3, 117) = 3.28, p < .05, but there was only a significant difference between 246 
Year 2 and Year 6 children, p < .017. Light-faster predictions (M = 6.34%, SD = 23.60) 247 
occurred significantly less frequently than if performing at chance level, t(120) = -12.59, p < 248 
.001, r = .75, with the same effect noted for each age group. There was no significant 249 
variation among the four age groups. Same-speed predictions (M = 5.37%, SD = 20.89) also 250 
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occurred significantly less frequently than if performing at chance level, t(120) = -14.73, p < 251 
.001, r = .80, with the same effect noted for each age group. Again there was no significant 252 
age-related variation. Overall, the heavy ball was predicted to be faster more frequently than 253 
the light ball, t(120) = 17.78, p < .001, r = .85, but there was no significant difference 254 
between light-faster and same-speed predictions. 255 
 256 
3.2 Recognition task 257 
 258 
Recognition of heavy-faster trajectories as being correct (M = 44.63%, SD = 39.69) did not 259 
deviate significantly from performance at chance level. Recognition of light-faster 260 
trajectories as being correct (M = 4.96%, SD = 16.34) was significantly below chance level, 261 
t(120) = -30.33, p < .001, r = .94. Recognition of same-speed trajectories as being correct (M 262 
= 79.75%, SD = 35.70) was significantly above chance level, t(120) = 9.17, p < .001, r = .64. 263 
The same trajectory-related effects were noted within each age group, but there were no 264 
significant age-related variations. Overall, same-speed trials were recognised as being correct 265 
more frequently than the incorrect heavy-faster trajectories, t(120) = -5.59, p < .001, r = .45. 266 
The incorrect heavy-faster trajectories in turn were recognised as being correct more 267 
frequently than the equally incorrect light-faster trajectories, t(120) = 10.09, p < .001, r = .68. 268 
Although recognition scores did not vary with age with increasing age children made 269 
faster responses. This was the case for heavy-faster trials, F(3, 117) = 13.37, p < .001, light-270 
faster trials, F(3, 117) = 11.28, p < .001, and same-speed trials, F(3, 117) = 11.68, p < .001. 271 
Mean heavy-faster trial response times (M = 3765 ms, SD = 1332) were significantly higher 272 
than for light-faster trials (M = 2243 ms, SD = 1114), t(120) = 29.52, p < .001, r = .94, but 273 
mean response times for light-faster and same-speed trials (M = 2303 ms, SD = 1134) did not 274 
differ significantly. The heavy-faster trials were then examined in more detail by comparing 275 
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response times when both trials were rejected, one was accepted as correct or both were 276 
accepted as correct. Mean two-trial rejection times (M = 2996 ms, SD = 1337) were 277 
significantly lower than mean one-trial acceptance times (M = 3956 ms, SD = 1233), t(87) = -278 
3.52, p < .05, r = .35, which in turn were significantly lower than mean two-trial acceptance 279 
times (M = 4584 ms, SD = 788), t(74) = -2.53, p < .05, r = .28. 280 
 281 
4. Discussion 282 
 283 
This study was an attempt to evaluate children’s predictions and recognition of dynamic 284 
events, with particular reference to the role played by object mass. The study sought to 285 
answer several questions related to this issue. Firstly, are the widely held limitations observed 286 
in children’s explicitly stated predictions an accurate expression of their overall 287 
understanding about motion? Leading on from this, can children appropriately recognise 288 
physically correct and physically incorrect dynamic events on the basis of object mass? If so, 289 
how does their recognition of such events compare with their predictive beliefs? And finally, 290 
what is the relational manifestation of the different knowledge levels?  291 
As far as the prediction task is concerned, children consistently believed that the heavy 292 
ball would be faster than the light ball. These predictions show no significant variation across 293 
the age groups and reflect the literature addressing children’s beliefs about object fall (Baker 294 
et al., 2009; Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a; Nachtigall, 1982; Sequeira 295 
& Leite, 1991; van Hise, 1988). At the same time, despite holding predictive conceptions 296 
incommensurate with real events it is clear from the present results that the same children are 297 
able to correctly recognise object motion. Accuracy is revealed in their ability to accept 298 
physically natural events as correct and to reject non-natural events. This general finding is in 299 
line with prior literature on underlying recognition (Friedman, 2002; Howe et al., 2012, 2014; 300 
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Kaiser & Proffitt, 1984; Kaiser et al., 1992; Kannass et al., 1999; Kim & Spelke, 1992, 1999; 301 
Naimi, 2011; Shanon, 1976), particularly with those of the studies that are concerned with 302 
children. More specifically, however, the findings suggest that children can correctly 303 
recognise dynamic events despite the central role object mass plays in the development of 304 
predictive beliefs about motion. Their predictions are considered to be explicit conceptual 305 
knowledge since identical responses were obtained in tasks requiring children to give verbal 306 
justifications for their predictions using the same apparatus (Hast & Howe, 2013a) and 307 
showing high similarity between real-life object tasks and computer-presented versions (see 308 
Hast & Howe, 2013b). 309 
Nonetheless, the role of object mass does not appear to be entirely irrelevant in recognition 310 
of events. Children consistently acknowledged the correctness of trials where the balls 311 
travelled at same speeds. At the same time, they almost always rejected light-faster trials – 312 
trials that are neither physically correct nor reflected in their predictions. No significant 313 
changes with age were noted, suggesting some stability in recognition of motion across 314 
childhood. Trials corresponding to explicit predictions, on the other hand, were recognised as 315 
correct rather frequently: Children fairly often recognised incorrect trials to be correct where 316 
the heavy ball was faster. This may be linked to deliberation. Underlying knowledge is 317 
typically associated with fast evaluation whereas explicit knowledge is accessed through 318 
prolonged evaluation (Collins, 2010). More careful reflection on scenarios may have 319 
provided access to explicit knowledge structures. Research with young children may provide 320 
similar supportive insight. Upon following falling events 2-year-olds initially looked at the 321 
correct location but then largely pointed at an incorrect location (Lee & Kuhlmeier, 2013). 322 
Here, too, children may initially have held underlying expectations that were correct but 323 
prolonged deliberation resulted in misconception. This also seems to be exemplified by the 324 
response time data, although more careful examination in task variations would help shed 325 
CHILDREN’S PREDICTIONS AND RECOGNITION OF FALL 14 
more light on this matter, such as through time constraints and the impact on recognition 326 
accuracy. Despite this issue, as a whole the children were still much better at recognising true 327 
dynamic events but simply refined their ability to do so with increasing age. 328 
Failure in various search tasks is denoted by toddlers reaching for incorrect locations, 329 
especially when multiple incorrect locations are provided – but looking behaviour data in 330 
these same studies indicate that they are aware of the correct location (e.g. Baker, Gjersoe, 331 
Sibielska-Woch, Leslie, & Hood, 2011; Haddad, Kloos, & Keen, 2008; Hood, Cole-Davies, 332 
& Dias, 2003). Indeed, recent work addressing conceptual knowledge in a range of domains 333 
has identified that although scientific knowledge can be learnt it does not appear to replace 334 
earlier understanding about those concepts (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). It is plausible that 335 
additional task requirements, in this case processing of language when choosing response 336 
options, interfere with retrieval of underlying information (cf. Low, 2010). Parallels can thus 337 
be drawn to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) discussion that mastery of a particular executive skill 338 
level is required before a new skill level can be engaged with. This would also explain why 339 
children did not differ across age groups in their actual recognition scores but did improve by 340 
becoming faster at reaching the same level of decisions. As this study only focused on middle 341 
childhood it is possible that further refinement either in terms of accuracy or in terms of 342 
response speed would be noted towards adulthood (cf. Naimi, 2011) that could help explore a 343 
more complete developmental trajectory. However, because different task types require skills 344 
of different difficulty level (e.g. looking, reaching or verbal responses) each mode is 345 
represented at the same time but only the most relevant information is actively retrieved. The 346 
work by Shtulman and Valcarcel, and other work showing, for instance, Alzheimer’s patients 347 
reverting to childhood conceptions (Lombrozo, Kelemen, & Zaitchik, 2007), would appear to 348 
support this notion.  349 
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But are these layers a single representation of knowledge, independent from one another, 350 
or overlapping? Out of the three potential views offered in the literature, omission (Kim, 351 
2012; Kim & Spelke, 1999; Spelke & Hespos, 2001) would appear to be the least likely 352 
candidate. For if the disparity observed in the present study were due to omission, then 353 
deliberation should call upon underlying knowledge and leave out conceptual elements. But 354 
since object mass actually plays a very minor role in natural object motion events, same-355 
speed recognition would not necessarily depend on any understanding of mass in order to 356 
correctly identify trials, and children are evidently satisfactorily adept in their recognition of 357 
events. Yet they specifically call upon mass in order to support their – mostly erroneous – 358 
predictions. It therefore seems more likely that predictive beliefs during childhood are either 359 
the result of an independently developed knowledge system or that they are an embellished 360 
form of tacit understanding, whereby additional information about object mass is added to the 361 
underlying knowledge structures. This means the hypothesis R = H>L=S cannot be accepted 362 
here. 363 
Distinguishing further between separate systems (Hogarth, 2001; Plessner & Czenna, 364 
2008) and the hybrid model (Carey, 2009; Howe, 2014; Howe et al., 2012, 2014), on the 365 
other hand, is a more formidable task. Nonetheless, the results from the present study seem to 366 
favour the hybrid model, since here too the substantial instances of recognition that mirror 367 
predictive knowledge suggest overlap between the two knowledge systems in a way that was 368 
anticipated by the hypothesis R = S>H>L. Instead it is suggested that access to relevant 369 
conceptual structures is affected by various factors such as language and executive control 370 
and is therefore dependent on task requirements – looking, manual or verbal – that determine 371 
the depth of conceptual layers that needs to be overcome. In a simple recognition task 372 
children may merely need to map dynamic events onto relevant pre-existing models and 373 
rejection or acceptance is based on the goodness of fit with these models. Explicit predictions 374 
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require input from some form of symbolic representation such as language or symbols which 375 
may add onto the underlying knowledge, such as through discourse (an explanatory dual-376 
pathway model of reasoning is presented in Hast, 2014). This is equally compatible with the 377 
dual processing pathways used to explain differences between infants and toddlers (e.g. 378 
Gjersoe & Hood, 2009) but favours the view that they are not separable from one another. 379 
 380 
5. Conclusion 381 
 382 
Children’s knowledge about the physical world is extensive but often expressed in a 383 
manner incommensurate with scientific views. At the same time a popular viewpoint is that 384 
we hold underlying knowledge about physical events that, at its core, remains unaltered 385 
throughout development, but with further knowledge added to it. The present study shows 386 
that while children’s predictions are inaccurate their recognition of related dynamic events is 387 
largely correct. However, instead of omitting information at the predictive level it appears 388 
children are adding mass as a key variable. Such additional conceptual layers may hinder 389 
access to underlying knowledge, depending on task requirements, but underlying knowledge 390 
may nonetheless still be tapped through recognition tasks and access may become easier with 391 
increasing age. 392 
 393 
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